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CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
HOMICIDE: A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
JAMES W. HARLOW †
ABSTRACT
Since the nineteenth century, judges, legislators, prosecutors, and
academics have grappled with how best to accommodate within the
criminal law corporations whose conduct causes the death of others.
The result of this debate was a gradual legal evolution towards
acceptance of corporate criminal liability for homicide. But, as this
Note argues, the underlying legal framework for such liability is ill
fitting and largely ineffective. Given the public benefit that would
accrue from a clearly defined and potent liability scheme, this Note
proposes a model criminal statute that would hold corporations
directly liable for homicide. The proposed statute draws upon basic
precepts of corporate criminal liability, as well as legislative
developments in the United Kingdom and the insights of
organizational theory. Ultimately, this Note argues that a statutory
scheme would allow prosecutions of corporations for homicide to
proceed more accurately, effectively, and fairly.

INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 2010, an explosion ripped through the Upper Big
Branch coal mine in West Virginia, claiming the lives of twenty-nine
1
miners. A report commissioned by West Virginia’s governor
determined that the explosion was caused by the ignition of methane
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1. John M. Broder, Fatal Mine Blast Was Preventable, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2011, at A17.
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and coal dust, which had built up in the mine due to insufficient
2
ventilation and malfunctioning water-spray systems. From June 2006
to April 2010, federal officials had cited Performance Coal Company,
a subsidiary of Massey Energy and the owner of the Upper Big
3
Branch mine, hundreds of times for serious safety violations. In
fourteen of the fifteen months leading up the explosion, the Upper
Big Branch mine received citations related to its handling of coal
4
dust—a primary cause of the April 5th explosion. Despite these
repeated safety violations, Upper Big Branch management did not
implement an effective compliance program, instead adopting a
5
“catch me if you can” mentality toward regulation.
In April 2010, an explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon
6
oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico claimed eleven lives. A presidential
investigatory commission found that the explosion resulted from a
failure to properly seal off the well and contain the enormous
7
pressures that had built up inside. The commission also determined
that the root causes of the explosion could “be traced back to
underlying failures of management and communication” by BP—
formerly British Petroleum—who, along with its partners, owned and
8
operated the rig. For example, BP engineers had continued to revise
the procedure for sealing the well until hours before the explosion
9
without a full risk assessment. Furthermore, prior to the explosion,
rig workers had worried about safe practices taking a back seat to
drilling operations and about their inability to communicate their
10
concerns to senior managers ashore. Transocean, the company that
operated the rig, left the crew in the dark about an “eerily similar

2. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5,
2010, EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES 16, 23 (2011).
3. Sam Hananel, Federal Prosecutors Are Conducting Criminal Probe in W.Va. Mine
Explosion, WASH. POST, May 15, 2010, at A16.
4. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 54.
5. David A. Fahrenthold & Kimberly Kindy, Safety Chief Details Mine’s History of
Violations, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at A2.
6. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING, at vi (2011).
7. Id. at 115.
8. Id. at 122.
9. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, MACONDO: THE GULF OIL DISASTER 140 (2011).
10. Ian Urbina, Workers on Doomed Rig Voiced Concern on Safety, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2010, at A1.
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near-miss” that took place on another rig a few months before the
11
Deepwater Horizon explosion.
Between June and November of 2010, six residents at North
Carolina’s Glen Care assisted-living center died after being infected
12
with hepatitis B during blood-sugar checks by facility staff. Upon
investigation, state health inspectors found that the staff were
generally untrained in disease prevention and had reused improperly
sterilized equipment to check the residents’ glucose levels—both of
13
which constituted regulatory violations. Although the center’s
management had known that precautionary training was required by
14
state law and had offered training sessions for staff members,
management had failed to ensure that all of the staff members had
15
received the necessary instruction.
Each of the above examples illustrates a common flaw in the
16
relationship between a corporation and its employees or the
consumers of its products. In each instance, a corporation failed to
adhere to government regulations or to internal policies designed to
prevent harm. Each lapse resulted in the death of at least one
individual, suggesting the potential applicability of criminal homicide
law. Yet none of these examples will likely result in the filing of
17
homicide charges, let alone a successful prosecution for the crime.

11. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 124.
12. Thomas Goldsmith, Diabetes Care Gap Feared, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Dec. 26,
2010, at 1A.
13. Mandy Locke, Dirty Diabetes Test Kits Blamed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov.
17, 2010, at 1A; see also Goldsmith, supra note 12 (“What we saw were people who were not
trained in fighting infection . . . . It’s not even sloppiness; it’s really ignorance.” (quoting Julie
Henry, spokeswoman for the N.C. Division of Public Health)).
14. Glen Care of Mt. Olive, Statement of Deficiencies 1, 3–4 (N.C. Div. of Health Serv.
Regulation Nov. 5, 2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
15. See id. at 2–3 (noting the nonattendance of employees at a safety lecture); Locke, supra
note 13 (describing how several employees admitted to checking blood-sugar levels even though
they had not attended training sessions on the subject).
16. This Note uses the term “corporation” throughout for the sake of brevity. The term
should be read to refer to all manner of business entities regardless of formal incorporation
status, including partnerships, limited liability companies, and other such entities.
17. Federal prosecutors continue to investigate the Upper Big Branch mine explosion,
Hananel, supra note 3, but a similar federal criminal investigation into a deadly explosion at a
Utah mine strongly suggests that homicide charges are unlikely to be forthcoming, see Howard
Berkes, Still No Criminal Charges in 2007 Utah Mine Disaster, TWO-WAY: NPR’S NEWS BLOG
(June 16, 2011, 12:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/06/16/137213027/still-nocriminal-charges-in-2007-utah-mine-disaster (“Four years after nine coal miners and mine
rescuers died underground in the Crandall Canyon mine in Utah, federal prosecutors say
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This Note proceeds according to several basic premises: First, a
corporation may be directly responsible for the deaths of the
employees, consumers, and members of the general public with whom
it interacts. Second, in situations of systemic internal misconduct or
corporate recidivism, civil regulatory penalties and private lawsuits
are insufficient to vindicate society’s interest in punishing the entity
responsible for these deaths. Third, there are instances when a
corporate entity is a truly blameworthy actor, rather than—or in
addition to—individual employees, and when a criminal sanction
18
against the corporation would have the greatest effect. This may be
particularly true for large corporations given their complex
19
bureaucratic structures. Fourth, current homicide schemes are ill
20
equipped to accommodate corporate defendants. Historically, there
have been few significant corporate prosecutions for homicide. Those
that have occurred have tended to be against small companies in
which ownership and management were united in the same
21
individuals, who were also charged individually. The paucity of
successful prosecutions suggests that current law does not provide
prosecutors with the power to bring corporate homicide charges or,
that if the power exists, its lack of clarity discourages prosecutors
from bringing cases.
To reconcile these basic premises, this Note proposes a statutory
scheme that would allow corporate homicide prosecutions to proceed
more accurately, effectively, and fairly. This proposal would improve

they’re still not ready to file criminal charges or to conclude that no charges are warranted.”).
The North Carolina Glen Care facility could face a $20,000 civil penalty and increased
monitoring by health officials. Locke, supra note 13. Interestingly, reports indicate that federal
authorities are at least considering bringing manslaughter charges against the companies behind
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill under the federal Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1115 (2006). Jerry Markon, Criminal Charges Considered in Oil Spill, WASH. POST, Mar. 30,
2011, at A2.
18. To clarify, this Note does not contend that corporate liability should replace individual
culpability. If culpable individuals are found, they should be prosecuted for manslaughter or
homicide. Rather, the proposed statute seeks to patch a hole in the criminal-liability fabric.
19. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 834
(1927) (“[I]t may on occasion, be clear enough that some individuals have committed a crime for
corporate purposes, and yet not clear who those individuals are. It is moreover relatively
difficult to apprehend and prosecute a number, particularly a large number, of individuals, even
if their identity is known; the corporation is always readily available.”).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See, e.g., State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 916, 928 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2010) (affirming a sewage-treatment company’s conviction for negligent homicide based on the
acts of its president).
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accuracy by acknowledging the true severity and blameworthiness of
corporate conduct. It would increase efficacy by opening up avenues
for criminal liability. And it would advance principles of fairness by
providing notice to corporate actors and by advocating for sentences
focused on rehabilitation. Prior scholarship on corporate homicide is
limited because it was written immediately after formative doctrinal
events, without the benefit of several decades of practical
22
development. Moreover, prior statutory proposals either sought to
expand criminal liability to encompass life-endangering acts of
23
24
corporations or to limit it to workplace incidents. In contrast, this
Note relies on experiences in the United States and abroad to craft a
statute narrow enough to avoid overcriminalization but broad enough
to reach serious corporate misconduct.
Part I of this Note recounts the development of corporate
criminal liability for homicide. Part II analyzes the policy rationales
for and against the use of criminal law to hold corporations liable for
homicide. Part III identifies failings within the current U.S. system of
corporate homicide liability. Part IV reviews the corporate homicide
statutory scheme enacted in the United Kingdom. And Part V
proposes a corporate homicide statute, explains each section of the
statute, and provides several illustrative applications.
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
FOR HOMICIDE
This Part briefly reviews precedents relating to corporate
criminal liability for homicide. It traces the early, largely unsuccessful
attempts to hold corporations criminally liable for homicide. Then, it

22. For examples of earlier scholarship on corporate homicide, see generally Kathleen F.
Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 753 (1987); Patrick Hamilton, Comment, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Injuries and Death, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1091 (1992); Donald J. Miester, Jr.,
Comment, Criminal Liability for Corporations That Kill, 64 TUL. L. REV. 919 (1990); and John
E. Stoner, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control
Corporate Behavior?, 38 SW. L.J. 1275 (1985).
23. See, e.g., W. Allen Spurgeon & Terence P. Fagan, Criminal Liability for LifeEndangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400, 430–32 (1981)
(advocating for the adoption of a criminal prohibition against life-endangering corporate
conduct).
24. See, e.g., Anne D. Samuels, Note, Reckless Endangerment of an Employee: A Proposal
in the Wake of Film Recovery Systems To Make the Boss Responsible for His Crimes, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 873, 902–04 (1987) (drafting a criminal statute prohibiting the reckless
endangerment of an employee).
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surveys the modern developments in corporate homicide doctrine and
summarizes the existing state of the law.
A. Early Prosecution Efforts
Early efforts to prosecute corporations for homicide were
grounded in a pragmatic desire to balance increasing corporate power
over social and economic life with the public’s need to hold corporate
25
entities accountable for their actions. Reflecting this desire, a federal
26
appellate court held in United States v. Van Schaick that “[a]
27
corporation can be guilty of causing death by its wrongful act.” Van
Schaick arose after a steamship disaster left hundreds dead and the
corporate shipowner was indicted for manslaughter under a federal
maritime statute that prohibited fraudulent and negligent safety
28
practices. The court unhesitatingly dismissed the arguments against
29
corporate liability, finding that Congress had not intended “to give
the owner impunity simply because it happened to be a
30
corporation.” The Van Schaick court declined to absolve “corporate
carriers by sea [that] kill their passengers through misconduct that
31
would be a punishable offense if done by a natural person.”
Several years later, in 1909, the Supreme Court echoed the
pragmatic reasoning of Van Schaick in its seminal decision in New
32
York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, basing
federal corporate criminal liability on the principle of respondeat
33
superior. The Court justified its extension of corporate criminal
25. It is important to distinguish between holding the corporate entity liable for homicide
and holding individual officers and employees personally liable. At the time of Blackstone, the
former was unknown at common law; the latter was generally accepted. See 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or
other crime, in it’s corporate capacity: though it’s members may, in their distinct individual
capacities.” (footnote omitted)). This Note is concerned with the former.
26. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
27. Id. at 602.
28. Id. at 595–96. The steamship’s captain and the company’s officers were also indicted for
manslaughter. Id. at 594–95.
29. It was argued that the corporate defendant could not be indicted because the sole
statutory penalty was imprisonment, which it could not serve. Id. at 602.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
33. Id. at 494–95. For a richer explication of modern respondeat superior doctrine, see
Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial
Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 64–65 (2007). Much ink has been
spilled decrying and defending the New York Central decision. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The
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liability by highlighting the centrality of corporations to the country’s
34
economic life, the corporation’s ability to commit the charged
35
offense, and the public-policy benefits afforded by criminal
36
liability.
Although the federal courts in Van Schaick and New York
Central were willing to construe federal statutes to cover corporate
conduct, state courts were fractured in their application of general
homicide statutes to corporate entities. In State v. Lehigh Valley
37
Railroad , the Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted a negligence38
based prosecution of a railroad for involuntary manslaughter. The
court held that it would accept corporate criminal liability “unless
there is something in the nature of the crime, the character of the
punishment prescribed therefor, or the essential ingredients of the
crime, which makes it impossible for a corporation to be held”
39
liable. As the capacity for corporate criminal liability in negligencebased crimes was “elementary,” the involuntary manslaughter charge
40
easily fit within that scheme. The court cautioned, however, that
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1329, 1338, 1358 (2009) (characterizing corporate criminal liability as violating “all three of
the necessary conditions for criminal responsibility” and “inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of a liberal society”); Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 824 (1996) (“The respondeat superior theory was the only
approach available in New York Central to preserve corporate criminal liability in the face of
the due process challenge without completely foreclosing other constitutional protections to
corporate defendants.”). Nevertheless, the holding of New York Central is a legal fixture
unlikely to be overturned. And this is for the best. Although pure respondeat superior may not
be the perfect means of attaching criminal liability to corporations, it is by no means unjust or
illogical.
34. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495 (“[T]he great majority of business transactions in
modern times are conducted through these bodies, and . . . interstate commerce is almost
entirely in their hands . . . .”).
35. See id. (noting that by prohibiting certain railroad rebates, “[t]his statute does not
embrace things impossible to be done by a corporation”).
36. See id. (warning that if corporate criminal liability were impossible, “many offenses
might go unpunished and acts be committed in violation of law, where, as in the present case,
the statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to refrain from certain practices forbidden
in the interest of public policy”).
37. State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 103 A. 685 (N.J. 1917).
38. Id. at 687.
39. Id. at 685–86.
40. Id. at 686. To support its claim that corporate liability for negligence was “elementary,”
the court referred to nineteenth-century developments that held corporations liable for what
Professor V.S. Khanna characterizes as “all offenses that did not require criminal intent.” V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477,
1481 (1996).
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“voluntary manslaughter involves ingredients quite different from
41
those involved in involuntary manslaughter,” suggesting that it
would not so readily permit an indictment for the more serious
homicide charge.
As intimated by the Lehigh Valley court’s reservations about
voluntary manslaughter, many state courts in the early- to midtwentieth century held that their respective general homicide statutes
did not encompass corporate entities. Absent specific legislative
instruction, several courts categorically dismissed corporate
42
indictments for manslaughter. For example, New York’s homicide
statute, as then drafted, proscribed “the killing of one human being
43
by the act, procurement or omission of another.” In rejecting an
attempt to charge a corporation with manslaughter, a New York
court held that, absent legislative intent “to abandon the limitation of
its enactments to human beings or to include a corporation as a
44
criminal,” a homicide statute should be construed to mean a killing
45
“by another human being.” The New York court acknowledged,
however, that this was primarily a matter of legislative draftsmanship
because a homicide statute “might have been formulated which
46
would be applicable to a corporation.”
As drafted, homicide statutes implicitly reflected the belief of
policymakers that there were some crimes for which corporations
simply could not—or should not—be liable. Even the Supreme Court,
as it was broadly expanding corporate criminal liability in New York
Central, acknowledged that “there are some crimes, which in their
47
nature cannot be committed by corporations.” This reluctance to
permit corporate prosecutions for homicide persisted at the time of
the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) drafting in the 1950s. In the course of
promulgating an alternative standard to respondeat superior for
48
corporate criminal liability, the MPC’s drafters surveyed past
corporate prosecutions and found that they were “restricted for the

41. Lehigh Valley, 103 A. at 686.
42. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 153 S.W. 459, 461 (Ky. 1913) (“[H]omicide,
in any of its degrees, is not an offense for which a corporation may be indicted . . . .”); People v.
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22, 24 (N.Y. 1909) (“[W]e do not discover any evidence of
an intent on the part of the Legislature to abandon the limitation of its enactments to human
beings or to include a corporation as a criminal.”).
43. Rochester Ry. & Light, 88 N.E. at 24 (quoting N.Y. PENAL CODE § 179 (1908)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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most
part
to
thefts—including
frauds—and
involuntary
49
manslaughter.” There had been no case in which “a corporation was
50
sought to be held criminally liable for . . . murder.” The lack of any
development of corporate liability for homicide thus continued to
reflect the prevailing sentiment at the time that “homicide by its very
51
nature lies in the field of inherently human relations.”
B. Modern Developments in Prosecuting Corporations for Homicide
In the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers reconceptualized corporate
criminal liability for homicide. Alongside the creation of regulatory
52
bodies charged with ensuring employee and consumer safety, the
judiciary interpreted statutory amendments as removing ideological
and doctrinal barriers to corporate homicide prosecutions. In
practice, however, these developments did not remove all of the
obstacles in the path of an optimal corporate homicide scheme.
With a subtle yet significant stroke of the pen, legislatures
broadened corporate criminal liability for homicide by amending the
definitional provisions in state penal codes. Early attempts to charge
corporations with homicide had floundered because the homicide
statutes required that the victim be a “person” and that the conduct
53
be committed “by another.” To remedy this limitation, legislatures
amended their penal codes to include corporations within the basic
definition of a “person” and to delete the requirement that certain

47. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909); see also
Edgerton, supra note 19, at 841 (arguing in 1927 that there was no legal bar that “preclude[d]
the commission of some crimes, like murder, . . . by corporations”).
48. The MPC predicates corporate liability upon the conduct of corporate employees of
sufficient standing within the corporation’s power structure. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07(1)(c) 1962) (attaching liability to conduct that has been “authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
employment”).
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmts. at 150 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
50. Id.
51. State v. Pac. Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530, 532 (Or. 1961) (en banc) (holding that a
corporation cannot be indicted for homicide); see also Brickey, supra note 22, at 753 (describing
early corporate prosecutions for homicide as “anomalous”).
52. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (2006)) (creating the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC)); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006)) (creating the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)).
53. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
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54

crimes be committed by a human being. A caveat commonly
accompanied these definitional amendments, however, stipulating
that corporate criminal liability should attach only “where
55
appropriate.”
Several courts seized upon these legislative amendments, seeing
56
them as a manifestation of the legislature’s “clear intention” to
57
expand corporate criminal liability to homicide. In so doing, these
courts accepted without discussion that homicide constituted a
legislatively “appropriate” extension of criminal liability to
58
corporations. In at least one state, the judicial expansion of
homicide liability to corporations was deemed valid not because of
prior legislative action, but because of subsequent legislative
59
inaction.
In the wake of these legislative and judicial developments,
prosecutors around the country began filing homicide charges against
60
corporate actors. This expanded use of corporate homicide charges
was also the product of highly publicized examples of extreme

54. Brickey, supra note 22, at 758.
55. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.080(12) (West 2006) (“‘Person’ means a human
being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a
partnership, a government, or a governmental authority . . . .” (emphasis added)).
56. Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
57. See, e.g., People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding
that after the inclusion of a corporation within the Penal Code’s definition of personhood, “a
corporation cannot be the victim of a homicide, [but] it may commit that offense and be held to
answer therefor”); Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 494 A.2d 1139, 1142–43 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that a corporation is a person within the statutory definition of
involuntary manslaughter); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (en banc) (“The Legislature, recognizing that for years Texas was the only
jurisdiction in which corporations bore no general criminal responsibility, and aware of the
previous roadblocks in case law to the prosecution of corporations for criminal offenses, enacted
statutes to remedy the situation.”).
58. See Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9 (Ct. App. 1983)
(describing the Ebasco Services and Fortner LP Gas courts’ expansion of liability to homicide as
resting upon “a much weaker [statutory] definition” due to the presence of “when appropriate”
language). The Arizona courts addressed the issue and adopted a default position of placing the
impetus on the legislature to specifically exclude, rather than include, corporate liability for
offenses. See State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 922–23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
59. See State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
that “the legislature [had been] aware that court decisions [had] held corporations criminally
liable” when it twice revised Wisconsin’s homicide statutes and noting that, “and on both
occasions, the legislature [had] elected not to undo corporate criminal liability”).
60. See, e.g., Michael B. Bixby, Workplace Homicide: Trends, Issues, and Policy, 70 OR. L.
REV. 333, 335–56 (1991) (surveying several prosecutions that occurred between 1985 and 1991
in which employee deaths led to homicide charges against the corporate employer).
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corporate misconduct that had resulted in death. For example, Ford
Motor Company was prosecuted for reckless homicide after three
young women died because their Ford Pinto burst into flames
61
Similarly, the manslaughter
following a rear-end collision.
prosecution of Film Recovery Systems after the death of an
62
undocumented Polish factory worker made national news. Finally,
the front page of the New York Times reported the manslaughter trial
of the Six Flags Corporation after eight New Jersey teenagers died in
63
an amusement park fire. One commentator describes these cases
and the others brought against corporations as a “prosecutorial
64
wave.” To date, at least fifteen states plus the federal government
have prosecuted corporations for manslaughter or criminally
65
negligent homicide.

61. See State v. Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2514, 2515 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1979) (sustaining
an indictment against Ford for reckless homicide because Ford “had sufficient notice of the
application of . . . reckless homicide to it”).
62. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, 3 Executives Convicted of Murder for Unsafe Workplace
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1985, at 1 (discussing the manslaughter conviction of the
corporation and the murder convictions of individual officers); see also Brickey, supra note 22,
at 770–75 (describing the prosecution of Film Recovery Systems on the basis of dangerous
factory conditions and inaction from corporate officials who knew of the danger posed by
cyanide vapors).
63. Donald Janson, Great Adventure Owners Cleared of Criminal Charges in Fatal Fire,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1985, at 1; see also David J. Reilly, Comment, Murder, Inc.: The Criminal
Liability of Corporations for Homicide, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 378, 393–94 (1988)
(summarizing the procedural history of the Six Flags prosecution).
64. Carol L. Bros, A Fresh Assault on the Hazardous Workplace: Corporate Homicide
Liability for Workplace Fatalities in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 308 (1989).
65. See United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 602–05 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (permitting
the indictments of a corporation and its individual officers for manslaughter under a federal
maritime statute); State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 916 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
(affirming the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent homicide); Granite Constr.
Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 4 (Ct. App. 1983) (permitting the indictment of a
corporation for manslaughter under California law); People v. O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090, 1098
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing the involuntary manslaughter conviction of an Illinois corporation
and its individual officers based on mutually exclusive mental states); Ford Motor Co., 47
U.S.L.W. at 2515 (sustaining an indictment against Ford for reckless homicide under Indiana
law); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)
(upholding the indictment of a corporation for second-degree manslaughter under Kentucky
law); Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 842 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Mass. 2006) (affirming the
conviction of a corporation for motor-vehicle homicide under Massachusetts law); People v.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 438 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (sustaining the
indictment of a corporation for involuntary manslaughter under Michigan law); State v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 103 A. 685, 687 (N.J. 1917) (upholding the indictment of a corporation for
involuntary manslaughter under New Jersey law); People v. Ebasco Servs. Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d
807, 811–12 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (permitting, as a matter of New York law, the indictment of a
corporation for criminally negligent homicide but dismissing the indictment in the case on other
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Nonetheless, the current state of corporate homicide doctrine
suggests that the wave has lost its momentum. In jurisdictions where
corporate liability for homicide is accepted as a basic theoretical
66
premise, its reach has been constrained by judicial construction. The
reported cases of corporate homicide suggest that prosecutions are
67
skewed toward small businesses. Punishments for corporations—
even large ones—convicted of homicide at the state level tend to be
68
disproportionately smaller than the harm the corporation caused.
Lastly, the diminished and suboptimal state of corporate homicide
doctrine is reflected in the willingness of prosecutors to undercharge a
corporate entity even when its conduct is particularly egregious and
69
results in a loss of life.

grounds); State v. Consol. Rail Corp., C.A. No. L-81-033, 1981 WL 5726, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 24, 1981) (requiring the trial court to address the validity of a corporate indictment for
vehicular homicide under Ohio law); Commonwealth v. McIlwain Sch. Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d
413, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (sustaining the indictment of a corporation for criminal homicide
by vehicle under Pennsylvania law); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805, 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (affirming the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent
homicide under Texas law); State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 420, 429 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995) (affirming the conviction of a corporation for criminally negligent homicide under
Wisconsin law); Patrick J. Schott, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Work-Site Deaths:
Old Law Used a New Way, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 793, 805 (1988) (describing the Connecticut
prosecution of PGP Industries Inc. for criminally negligent homicide that was ultimately
dismissed during the trial); Randall Chase, Refinery Fined in Deadly Blast, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 9, 2003, at B03 (reporting that a corporation pled no contest to charges of criminally
negligent homicide under Delaware law).
66. See, e.g., O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1101 (reversing the convictions of the corporate and
individual defendants charged in the Film Recovery Systems case because the convictions were
“legally inconsistent,” given that the “same conduct [was] used to support offenses which ha[d]
mutually exclusive mental states”); People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 665–66
(N.Y. 1980) (dismissing the indictment against a corporate defendant for a factory explosion
that killed six employees because there was insufficient proof that the corporation could have
foreseen the explosion).
67. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 n.1 (1999) (“On average, small privately held
businesses account for more than 95% of all corporate convictions each year.”).
68. See infra note 227.
69. For example, in 2006, Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Company and several individual
managers were convicted of criminal conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and other offenses
related to the death of an employee who was driving an unsafe forklift. The evidence showed
that for months prior to the accident, managers and supervisors knew that employees were
being required to drive forklifts with inoperable brakes and other defects. United States v. Atl.
States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d 180, 328–29 (D.N.J. 2009). Strikingly, neither the
company nor the individual managers were charged for homicide.
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II. IS PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS FOR HOMICIDE SOUND
POLICY?
Although this Note ultimately endorses a redesigned regime of
70
corporate criminal liability for homicide, it is worth pausing to
discuss this proposal’s policy implications. The use of public policy in
the development of corporate criminal liability extends back one
71
century to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Central. This
Part considers whether the extension of corporate criminal liability to
homicide best serves society’s needs. It first makes the normative case
for criminal liability. Then it considers and rebuts several
counterarguments, including the sufficiency of civil remedies—e.g.,
private litigation or civil regulatory schemes—and the potential for
overdeterrence and overburdening businesses.
A. Policy Goals Served by Prosecutions
1. Corporate Entities May Be To Blame for the Loss of Life.
72
Modern corporations exercise great influence over social, political,
and economic life. Corporations also enjoy significant constitutional
73
and legal rights. The possession and proper exercise of this kind of
power are cornerstones of capitalism. Regrettably though, there are
instances in which corporate misconduct has caused significant harm
74
to communities. And even more regrettably, some of these
70. See infra Part V.
71. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
72. For example, from 1998 to 2010, twelve of the top twenty entities with the greatest
political lobbying expenditures were individual corporations; the twentieth-ranked company
spent over $100 million during that thirteen-year period. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying:
Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&
indexType=s (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). Another seven of the top spenders were industry
interest groups. Id.
73. See generally 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON
CORPORATIONS § 1.04 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the constitutional rights of corporations);
Henning, supra note 33 (describing the constitutional rights of corporations recognized by the
Supreme Court as being in the criminal realm). In 2010, the Supreme Court held that corporate
political speech unaffiliated with a specific political campaign enjoyed First Amendment
protection, thereby broadening the list of corporate rights beyond what courts had previously
recognized. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). One commentator opines that
after Citizens United, it has become easier to argue for corporate criminal liability because “an
entity that has political will also has free will.” Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United &
Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 77, 79 (2010).
74. Recent large-scale corporate malfeasances have included massive accounting frauds
and longstanding corporate initiatives to bribe public officials around the globe. See Sara Sun
Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481,

HARLOW IN FINAL

136

10/6/2011 6:52:03 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:123
75

76

occasions have led to the deaths of employees, consumers, and
77
members of the general public. This recitation is not intended to
suggest that corporations are bad. Rather, it is intended to illustrate
that in those rare cases when a corporation exercises its power and
violates the law, that corporation has “the ability to engage in
misconduct that dwarfs that which could be accomplished by
78
individuals.”
Criminal law should—and does—apply to blameworthy
79
corporate conduct that merits condemnation and punishment.
Arguments that corporations are mere legal fictions without distinct
80
identities, cultures, and moralities ignore the reality of the situation.
Organizational theorists recognize that an organization’s culture is
81
closely intertwined with its leadership. Management may create a
culture that sacrifices safety for profits, or it may create a safety-first
82
culture. The desire for profits can be a powerful—even irresistible—
83
force that can cause a corporation to hazard great risks. In such
1484 (2009) (noting that Siemens AG pled guilty for paying “more than $1.4 billion in bribes to
government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, using its
slush funds”); Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell
Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 91–95
(2004) (recounting examples of recent corporate financial frauds).
75. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 156.
77. See Daniel Barstow Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuring a Solution, 57 U. COLO.
L. REV. 835, 835 (1986) (noting that the release of poisonous gas from a Union Carbide India
Ltd. plant in Bhopal, India, “resulted in an estimated 2000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of
other personal injuries”).
78. Beale, supra note 74, at 1484.
79. See id. at 1482 (defending corporate criminal liability because corporations “are
enormously powerful, and very real, actors whose conduct often causes very significant harm
both to individuals and to society as a whole”).
80. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 493 (2006) (“The truth is that institutions do produce wrongdoing.”); see also id. at 493–95
(surveying psychological studies that describe how “people often behave differently—
sometimes better, sometimes worse—in institutional settings”).
81. See EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 3 (4th ed.
2010) (“[C]ulture is ultimately created, embedded, evolved, and ultimately manipulated by
leaders.”).
82. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1503, 1532 (2007) (“Companies can develop distinctive cultures (or an ethos) including values
that are contrary to general norms, which they encourage their employees to flout.”).
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmts. at 148–49 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)
(acknowledging that “there are probably cases in which the economic pressures within the
corporate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard personal liability for the
sake of company gain”); 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 8.21, at 384 (noting that when
corporate employees “feel compelled to risk penal sanctions to earn status, approval, or security
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cases, the corporation may be the truly blameworthy actor, rather
84
than any one employee. Thus, there are instances in which
individual “human behavior, including behavior legally defined as
criminal, . . . is explicable (even describable) only with reference to
85
the institutional settings where it arises.”
When a loss of life has occurred and a corporation itself is the
blameworthy entity, criminal law provides society with a uniquely
powerful tool to both express its condemnation of the corporation’s
actions and reform the corporation to ensure that its conduct will
86
conform with societal expectations going forward. Reflecting on the
Ford Pinto prosecution, for example, one commentator argues that
the prosecution’s principal significance was not its “attempt to
establish precedent for a new weapon to be deployed regularly
87
against corporate crime.” Instead, it was the prosecution’s “attempt
to make a corporation answer to a jury when business practices are
88
perceived as transgressions of a community’s moral boundaries.”
The expression of a community’s moral condemnation, even when
applied to corporations, is unique to criminal law and goes beyond
89
the utilitarian goals of rehabilitation and deterrence. There is
significant intrinsic value to this expressive force when it is applied to
90
corporations in the same way that it is applied to individuals.

in the corporate organization,” the “imposition of criminal liability on the corporation may be
necessary if undesired conduct is to be controlled” (emphasis added)); Spurgeon & Fagan, supra
note 23, at 413 n.66 (citing evidence that corporate managers perceived their colleagues as
unable to forsake increased profits and keep potentially dangerous products off the shelves).
84. See Beale, supra note 82, at 1532 (“[T]here are many reasons to think that corporations
and other entities are more than simply the sum of all of their employees and that punishing
individual employees individually for criminal conduct will not always be sufficient.”); see also
Brickey, supra note 22, at 784 (contending that rather than seeking individual scapegoats for an
organizational failure, “[t]he unfairness inherent in that prospect suggests compelling grounds
for declining to pierce the corporate veil”).
85. Buell, supra note 80, at 476.
86. See id. at 477–78 (arguing that “[b]ecause of its communicative force and preferenceshaping authority, only criminal process fully produces these effects of legally imposed entity
blame”).
87. William J. Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.: Constitutional, Utilitarian and Moral
Perspectives, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 862 (1983).
88. Id.
89. See Buell, supra note 80, at 537 (“[E]ntity criminal liability instantiates a social practice
of blaming institutions for crime that is characteristic of criminal law in its morally infused
message, and in the stigmatic impact of that message.”).
90. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1427 (2009) (“As an expression of the community’s moral judgment,
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91

Homicide is not an “artificial” crime. A corporation’s criminal
homicide sanction signifies that its conduct was grossly inimical to
society’s interests.
Finally, criminal law provides society with an important tool to
effectuate change within a corporate organization in a way that
92
fosters future conformity with societal expectations. A criminally
liable corporation is one in which individual employees take
erroneous actions and the necessary structures are not in place to
counter those erroneous choices. Put plainly, deficiencies exist at the
93
micro and macro levels within the organization. In response to a
sharp rebuke of its practices, the corporation is likely “to
reevaluat[e] . . . group arrangements, not just [to rethink] individual
94
choice[s].” Beyond this self-motivated change, criminal law may also
provide an avenue for court-supervised reevaluation and
95
restructuring as part of a criminal sentence.
2. Supplementing Regulatory Efforts.
Corporate homicide
liability may also supplement existing regulatory regimes by forcing
recidivist violators to comply with health and safety regulations and
acting as a backstop against lax regulatory oversight. Corporations
determined to undercut or work around regulations are motivated by
a simple cost-benefit analysis. Health and safety regulatory systems
are
successful
only
“where
the
expected
costs
of
honoring . . . regulations are less than or equal to the expected costs
96
of punishment.” The expected cost of punishment depends on “the

there is a significant value to applying the criminal law to organizations that act through their
agents . . . .”).
91. Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform:
The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1280
(2007). Thornburgh characterizes many of the crimes springing from the regulatory state as
“artificial” in the sense that “they do not meet the criteria traditionally employed in determining
that particular conduct deserves society’s most severe condemnation.” Id. Homicide liability
thus eludes many criticisms of increased corporate exposure to criminal sanctions.
92. See Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment Matter?, 19 J.L.
& POL’Y 83, 93 (2010) (“Demanding concrete changes in how an organization conducts itself is
a reasonable means of responding to the psychological perception that corporations can be
blameworthy.”).
93. See Buell, supra note 80, at 502 (“A message of institutional fault says something
different than a message of individual fault: not just that somebody pursued faulty preferences,
but that the group arranged itself badly.”).
94. Id.
95. For a more detailed discussion of this potential, see infra Part V.B.6.
96. Samuels, supra note 24, at 883.
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probability of inspection, the expected number of violations detected,
97
and the average penalty per violation.” The lower the cost of
punishment, the easier it is to accept serial regulatory violations to
protect the bottom line. Existing enforcement capabilities may skew
98
this analysis in favor of noncompliance. A homicide prosecution,
with its harsher moral and punitive sanctions, might change the
equation in particularly egregious cases and tip the scales toward
preemptive compliance.
For example, Massey Energy, the owner of the coal mine in
which twenty-nine miners died in an explosion, was known for
99
playing a cat-and-mouse game with federal mine-safety regulators.
Although Massey operated some of the most unsafe mines in the
100
nation, it was able to avoid regulation by “persuad[ing] regulators
to forgo safety rules on a case-by-case basis” and by “contest[ing]
federal citations in a manner that ma[de] it virtually impossible for
101
the government to force quick safety overhauls.” Recently, federal
authorities sought to employ their most powerful civil remedy by
going to court to close a Massey-owned mine and force a safety
102
overhaul of Massey’s operations. But Massey “sidestepped” federal
authorities and closed the mine on its own, keeping regulators “from
103
interfering with the company’s day-to-day operations.”

97. Id.
98. From 2006 to 2010, OSHA statistics reflected a significant increase in the number of
both willful and repeat violations. 2010 Enforcement Summary, OSHA, http://www.osha.gov/
dep/2010_enforcement_summary.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). Yet over that same period, the
number of cases referred for criminal prosecution never exceeded fifteen per year. Id. And even
then, the maximum criminal penalty for the first willful violation that resulted in death was a
$10,000 fine and six months in prison 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006). For a second conviction, the
penalty doubled. Id.
99. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. In January 2011, Massey Energy agreed to
sell itself to a rival coal company. Interestingly, the purchasing company has a strong record of
environmental and safety compliance. Michael J. de la Merced, Massey Energy Is To Be Sold to
Alpha Natural Resources, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 29, 2011, 7:09 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2011/01/29/massey-energy-is-to-be-sold-to-alpha-natural-resources.
100. See Kimberly Kindy, Longtime Tug of War on Mine Safety, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2011,
at A1 (reporting that Massey Energy owns the most mines of any company on the federal minesafety agency’s list of those in danger of being shut down).
101. Id.; see also GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 77
(describing Massey as “relish[ing] the opportunity to challenge inspectors’ enforcement actions
by disputing findings and arguing about what the law requires”).
102. See generally Complaint, Solis v. Freedom Energy Mining Co., No. 7:10-cv-00132-ART
(E.D. Ky. Nov. 3, 2010) (filing by the Secretary of Labor to close the mine).
103. Kindy, supra note 100.
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Consider also the case of McWane Industries. Between 1995 and
2003, the manufacturing company had an egregious record: nine
employees killed on the job, and citations for federal health and
safety violations that exceeded those of its “six major competitors
104
combined.”
In eight of the nine fatalities, the circumstances
reflected either “deliberate violations of federal safety standards” or
105
Nonetheless,
“[s]afety lapses” that contributed to the deaths.
government regulators were initially unable to coordinate an effective
response. Finally, after an exposé on McWane made national news,
the company was convicted of criminal charges based on operations
106
at six subsidiaries. More importantly, the company hired a new
safety director, spent $300 million to improve its health and
environmental safety, and embarked on creating a new culture of
107
safety.
Criminal law is admittedly a blunt instrument, but it may be
necessary to force a company to take corrective actions. Massey
Energy and McWane Industries are examples of companies that were
determined to avoid compliance with regulatory standards over
sustained periods of time. Shuttering a mine or taking post hoc
remedial action cannot abrogate a criminal indictment. As the case of
McWane exemplifies, criminal prosecutions may be successful as a
measure of last resort to bring about cultural change within a
corporation.
Criminal law can also serve a gap-filling function to ensure that
the public is not without recourse when government regulation is lax.
Budgets of regulatory agencies ebb and flow depending upon an
administration’s goals. During lean years, inspections are curtailed,
108
The presidential
and violations go unnoticed or unpunished.
commission investigating the Deepwater Horizon oil-rig fire

104. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, an Indifference to Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A1.
105. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2003, at A1.
106. James Sandler, The McWane Prosecutions, FRONTLINE (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.pbs
.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/mcwane/etc/prosecutions.html.
107. See Dave Johnson, 10 Essentials of McWane’s Culture Change, ISHN (June 3, 2010),
http://www.ishn.com/Articles/Cover_Story/BNP_GUID_9-5-2006_A_10000000000000836462
(interviewing the new safety director at McWane and reporting on the hiring of more health and
safety staffers to increase incident reporting and accountability).
108. See Kindy, supra note 100 (noting that under the George W. Bush administration, the
ranks of federal mine-safety inspectors were reduced by nine percent while the remaining
inspectors were rebranded as “compliance assistance specialists”).
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recounted how the absence of effective regulatory oversight had
109
contributed to deficient practices by private industry. Similarly, a
state commission investigating the Upper Big Branch explosion found
that mine-safety officials had performed their supervisory function
110
Given the powerful interests opposing strong
inadequately.
111
regulatory regimes, state and federal prosecutors, who are more
insulated from political pressures, can serve as effective watchdogs of
last resort.
B. Rebuttal of Arguments for Limiting Corporate Homicide Liability
1. Civil-Law Remedies Are Preferred. Critics of corporate
criminal liability argue that civil law achieves deterrence and victim
112
restitution at a lower cost to society. But the deterrent effect of civil
suits upon a serial regulatory violator is doubtful, particularly when
private lawsuits are settled for damages without imposing conditions
113
of structural reform. Private litigants, who do not enjoy access to
corporate treasuries to fund litigation, are incentivized to settle their
114
disputes out of court before incurring expensive trial costs.
Corporate defendants are also motivated to avoid the adverse

109. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 126 (“[N]either the regulations nor the regulators were asking the
tough questions or requiring the demonstration of preparedness that could have avoided
the . . . disaster.”).
110. See GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 77–78 (describing
the deficiencies in government regulatory efforts).
111. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 126 (recounting how “efforts to expand regulatory oversight, tighten
safety requirements, and provide funding to equip regulators with the resources, personnel, and
training needed to be effective were either overtly resisted or not supported by industry,
members of Congress, and several administrations”).
112. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 40, at 1532 (“Due to expensive procedural protections and
sanctioning costs from higher reputational penalties, sending the message [that society
condemns a corporate action] through corporate criminal proceedings costs society more than
sending the message through civil liability . . . .”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among
Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1459, 1479 (2009) (advocating for the diminution of corporate criminal prosecutions and
“for reforming, restoring, and enhancing private civil suits and agency regulation”).
113. See Samuels, supra note 24, at 880 (“Despite burgeoning civil judgments against
corporate defendants, corporate decisionmakers assessing the need for precautionary measures
too often find that the cost-efficient solution is also the most dangerous for their employees.”).
114. Id. at 886.
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115

publicity of a public trial. Criminal law, on the other hand, deals in
116
the unquantifiable—behavioral and moral reformation.
A more forceful critique of corporate criminal liability is that
convicted corporations may face collateral debarment or delicensing
proceedings that jeopardize the corporate existence, even if the
117
criminal sanctions themselves are minimal. For example, companies
118
convicted of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 are
barred from receiving government contracts in the United States and
119
the European Union. Corporate operators of a nursing home face
the loss of Medicare and Medicaid licensing upon a criminal
120
conviction. Because rehabilitation, not destruction, should be the
goal of a corporate homicide scheme, these are serious concerns. But
there are two rebuttals to this argument. First, civil proceedings or
government regulatory action may also produce debarment and
delicensing proceedings, so arguments that these consequences are
121
unique harms of criminal law are unavailing. Second, evidence
shows that prosecutors understand these collateral consequences and
115. Id. at 886–87.
116. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Civil
liability of corporations, even when it allows the award of punitive as well as compensatory
damages, is not a perfect substitute for [criminal punishment] because not all business activity
that society wants to deter inflicts monetizable harms.”); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 36
(“[C]rime is distinguished from other externalities because society has determined that in these
instances, the social benefits of preference shaping through the criminal justice system outweigh
the social costs because society values the utility derived from only one side of the incompatible
preferences.”).
117. See, e.g., Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2039 (1992) (suggesting that the
existence of debarment and delicensing mechanisms obviates the need for criminal sanctions
like corporate probation).
118. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
119. See FAR 9.406 (2010) (allowing discretionary debarment when it would be in the public
interest); Council Directive 2004/18, art. 45, 2004 O.J (L 134) 144 (EC) (barring any “candidate
or tenderer” convicted of certain corrupt practices from participation in public contracts).
120. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(3) (2010) (granting the authority to revoke Medicare
privileges when any “provider, supplier, or . . . owner of the provider or supplier” is convicted of
certain felonies); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. § 153.018(F) (1994) (providing for the denial of,
revocation of, or refusal to renew the licenses of long-term-care facilities for certain criminal
acts).
121. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. §§ 500.1–.2 (2011) (authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Food Safety and Inspection Service to take certain “regulatory control action[s],” including the
stoppage of production, in the case of violations); Beale, supra note 74, at 1502 (noting that
certain civil judgments, such as those for fraud, also result in the debarment of government
contractors).

HARLOW IN FINAL

2011]

10/6/2011 6:52:03 PM

CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE

143

that authorities have been willing to craft compromise solutions
without sacrificing the societal and rehabilitative ends served by a
122
criminal conviction.
Critics also point to the comparable basket of punitive and
123
remedial measures available through a civil judgment. But this
argument can be turned on its head: If civil and criminal ends are
equal, why is the criminal proceeding so unpalatable? Indeed, in a
criminal prosecution, a corporate defendant enjoys certain
protections, such as a higher burden of proof, that are unavailable in a
124
civil proceeding. Although a stigma accompanies a criminal trial
and conviction, it is no different than the one faced by individual
defendants who do not have immunity from prosecution. The
criminal law’s overarching value is its singular ability to “convey[] the
particular moral condemnation that expressive retribution
125
contemplates.” When a corporation faces only civil liability for
conduct that would give rise to criminal charges for an individual, it
allows “the corporation qua corporation to purchase exemption from
126
moral condemnation.”
2. Overdeterrence and Increased Costs of Doing Business. Critics
allege that an unwieldy use of criminal law will cause costly or
inefficient overdeterrence that unnecessarily burdens businesses.
These critics point to the danger that under a broad criminal statute,
prosecutors might second-guess the “reasoned business judgments” of

122. See Sue Reisinger, Don’t Call It Bribery, CORP. COUNS., May 2010, at 15, 17
(characterizing the Justice Department’s willingness to “pull[] its punches” and let BAE
Systems plead to a conspiracy charge not subject to immediate debarment rather than to a
substantive FCPA violation that would be subject to debarment as a “compromise settlement”);
Sandler, supra note 106 (describing how the EPA, after receiving evidence from McWane
Industries about its improved regulatory compliance, revised its initial recommendation of
debarment and instead imposed a fixed-term probationary exclusion from receiving government
contracts).
123. See, e.g., Howard E. O’Leary, Jr., Corporate Criminal Liability: Sensible Jurisprudence
or Kafkaesque Absurdity?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2008, at 24, 28 (describing how a civilly liable
corporation could be required to pay victim restitution and penalties and acquiesce to injunctive
relief, and, “with the exception of a criminal fine, the corporation would be subject to all of the
relief obtainable in a criminal prosecution”).
124. See Khanna, supra note 40, at 1512–20 (discussing how several criminal procedural
safeguards apply to corporate defendants).
125. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 854 (2000).
126. Id. at 858.
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127

“legitimate commercial activity.”
Moreover, the prospect of
criminal liability might have desultory effects on industries that are ill
128
equipped to withstand such scrutiny or that lack the funds to
129
But these concerns do not support an absolute
survive it.
prohibition on criminal sanctions so much as they emphasize the need
for its measured and balanced application. Whether civil or criminal
proceedings are used, the ultimate goal should remain the same: to
deter and prevent conduct that will lead to deaths. Industry itself
recognizes the importance of this goal, and many corporations
already have policies that place enhanced safety before saving time
130
and money. In exercising their discretion, prosecutors should assess
both the egregiousness of the corporation’s misconduct and the
likelihood that the regulatory system will be able to reform the
misconduct. Not every case should result in homicide charges. But
industry should be on notice that mere financial hardship cannot
excuse criminal behavior when a corporation’s conduct is particularly
131
blameworthy.
III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
FOR HOMICIDE
Despite the expansion of corporate liability for homicide in the
United States since the 1970s, there remains room for improvement.
132
The scheme is marked by a startling lack of clarity and efficacy.

127. Brickey, supra note 22, at 783.
128. See, e.g., Richard M. Dunn, Sherril M. Colombo & Allison E. Nold, Criminalization in
Aviation: Are Prosecutorial Investigations Relegating Aviation Safety to the Back Seat?, BRIEF,
Spring 2009, at 10, 20 (“[C]riminal investigations impede aviation safety by chilling the free flow
of information concerning the causes of accidents, but they fail to deter the negligent acts they
are prosecuting because most aviation accidents are not caused by willful or intentional
conduct.”).
129. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12 (reporting an assisted-living facility industry
lobbyist’s position that increased training of care providers is impossible because government
programs “don’t include enough money to pay for higher levels of training”).
130. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 126, 232–33 (detailing the “top-down safety culture” at major oil
firms ExxonMobil and Shell that “reward[s] employees and contractors who take action when
there is a safety concern even though such action costs the company time and money”).
131. See Buell, supra note 80, at 535 (“Prosecutorial guidelines ought to counsel the
selection of cases that will convey the message that a serious institutional lapse that produces
crime is deviant.”).
132. See Brickey, supra note 22, at 754 (identifying the lack of “a comprehensive rule of law
under which corporations and their officers are held criminally responsible for workplace deaths
and injuries” as “the most perplexing problem confronting the business community”).
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First, it remains uncertain whether a corporation may be held liable
for homicide in some jurisdictions. Second, the scheme is unable to
account for latent organizational failures that set the stage for loss-oflife incidents. The inability to penalize latent failures is one result of
an overall doctrinal deficiency and has resulted in a poor track record
of bringing criminal charges against large corporations, let alone of
securing convictions.
A. Definitional Deficiencies
That existing homicide statutes are nebulous in their application
to corporate defendants is unsurprising given that their drafters
133
historically focused on individual conduct. Recall that legislatures
corrected the most glaring definitional impediments to corporate
homicide prosecutions by amending their penal codes to include a
corporation as “persons” and deleting the requirement that the crime
134
be committed “by another.” Courts in several jurisdictions, though,
remained reluctant to impose criminal liability for certain offenses,
including homicide, without more specific legislative action.
For example, in 1961, the Oregon Supreme Court construed the
state’s manslaughter statute to preclude corporate liability, following
the legislature’s command to allow criminal liability “unless the
135
The court read the common-law
context requires otherwise.”
phraseology that homicide was the killing by one person of “another”
136
to exclusively mean a “human being.” In response, the Oregon
legislature amended the criminally negligent homicide provision to
encompass situations when “[a] person . . . causes the death of
137
another person.” But the general homicide provision retained the
language that homicide is when “[a] person . . . causes the death of
138
another human being.” As one commentator notes, these statutory
amendments left unsettled the larger doctrinal question “as to

133. See Bixby, supra note 60, at 356 (“Many of these [criminal] statutes were initially
drafted with individual conduct in mind and failed to indicate whether the statute applied to
actions taken, or not taken, by a business entity.”).
134. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
135. State v. Pac. Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530, 532 (Or. 1961) (en banc) (interpreting OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.010 (repealed 1971)).
136. Id.
137. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.145 (2009).
138. Id. § 163.005 (emphasis added).
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whether a party committing manslaughter must be a natural
139
person.”
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals also seized upon the
140
“where appropriate” proviso in the state’s penal code to hold that a
141
corporation could not be convicted of perjury. The court found that
“the Legislature has found it ‘appropriate’ to impose criminal liability
on corporations only for certain crimes enumerated in the Code: i.e.,
those crimes in which the Legislature has specifically provided for
142
corporate liability.” This definitional uncertainty serves neither
prosecutors, who are left unsure of their power to indict a corporation
for homicide, nor corporations, who are left without sufficient notice
143
of the fact that they may be indicted for homicide.
B. Latent Failures and Causation
Any prosecution of a corporation for homicide must prove that
144
the corporation’s conduct was causally linked to the death. A
narrow judicial construction of causality can result in no liability for a
corporate actor even though its policies, practices, or culture created
the conditions necessary for an act to prove deadly. For example, in
145
the corporate defendant was
People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
charged with second-degree manslaughter for a factory explosion that
146
killed six employees. Several months prior to the explosion, the
corporation’s insurer notified management that the factory’s

139. RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PREVENTION § 7.01, at
7-4 (13th version 2011).
140. ALA. CODE § 13A-1-2(11) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining a person as “[a] human being,
and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a
partnership, a government, or a governmental instrumentality”).
141. State v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So. 2d 230, 234 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
142. Id. at 233; see also Commonwealth v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 10 Va. Cir. 118, 118
(Cir. Ct. 1987) (declining to “extend corporate responsibility to crimes of personal violence”
because “[i]f public policy requires the extension of corporate responsibility in this area, that is a
matter for the Legislature and not this Court”).
143. See Samuels, supra note 24, at 891 (critiquing traditional homicide laws as “fail[ing] to
give adequate notice to corporations and their decisionmakers that their actions fall within the
scope of these statutory prohibitions and fail[ing] to set adequate guidelines to govern corporate
behavior”).
144. See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (15th ed. 1993)
(summarizing causation in criminal law as “requiring that the accused’s conduct be a substantial
factor in causing the harmful result or that it be the proximate, primary, direct, efficient, or legal
cause of such harmful result”).
145. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1980).
146. Id. at 661.
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machinery was susceptible to combustible residue buildups. The
corporation decided to wait and replace the machinery gradually over
148
several months, and the fatal incident occurred in the interim. The
court dismissed the indictment because the corporation’s conduct
could neither be reckless nor negligent when there existed only “a
149
broad, undifferentiated risk of an explosion.” For homicide liability
to exist, there must be “proof sufficient to support a finding that
defendants foresaw or should have foreseen the physical cause of the
150
explosion.” In other words, it must be proven that the corporation
foresaw the precise conduct that caused the deadly explosion even if
the explosion itself—a sufficiently dangerous event—was
151
foreseeable.
Although the Warner-Lambert court found no basis for liability,
insights from organizational theory suggest that the corporation’s
152
“latent” failure could be a sufficient basis for criminal charges. A
latent failure occurs when one or more latent conditions—design
failures, insufficient training, and inadequate supervision, for
example—“combine with local circumstances and active failures”—in
other words, the acts by “front-line” personnel that have immediate,
153
adverse effects. Active failures are generally the result of discrete,
individual lapses, but latent conditions are the product of
management decisions whose dire consequences may not be apparent
154
for some time. It is easier to focus on active failures because of their
147. Id. at 662–63.
148. Id. at 663.
149. Id. at 661.
150. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
151. See People v. Roth, 604 N.E.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. 1992) (“For purposes of criminal liability, it
was not enough to show that, given the variety of dangerous conditions existing at the site, an
explosion was foreseeable; instead the People were required to show that it was foreseeable that
the explosion would occur in the manner that it did.”). But see State v. Far W. Water & Sewer
Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming the homicide conviction of a corporation
because its conduct “set in motion a series of events that led to the incident and which were not
so unforeseeable that it would be unfair to hold [the corporation] criminally liable,” regardless
of the fact that the “precise result or injury” could not have been foreseen); People v. Deitsch,
470 N.Y.S.2d 158, 164–65 (App. Div. 1983) (sustaining the indictment for criminally negligent
homicide of a corporation “who maintains what is, in effect, a fire trap, no matter what the
cause of the fire”).
152. See Celia Wells, Derek Morgan & Oliver Quick, Disasters: A Challenge for the Law, 39
WASHBURN L.J. 496, 499–501 (2000) (“Rarely, according to [the organizational approach], are
errors and disasters the product of the last link in the chain, i.e., the active error.”).
153. JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 10 (1997).
154. See id. at 11 (noting how latent conditions are “spawned in the upper echelons of the
organization”).
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immediate effects, but active failures “are now seen more as
155
consequences than as principal causes.”
Without the latent
conditions created by management, active failures might not take
place, or they might not have such devastating results.
A vivid example of a latent failure is the deadly fire on the
156
Deepwater Horizon rig. A presidential commission found that
“[m]ost, if not all, of the failures at [the rig could] be traced back to
underlying failures of management and communication” by BP and
157
its partners, who owned and operated the rig. Due to breakdowns
in information sharing, “individuals often found themselves making
critical decisions without a full appreciation for the context in which
they were being made (or even without recognition that the decisions
158
were critical).” For example, those managing the rig’s drilling
operations were unaware of the venture’s chain of command and of
159
Evidence
who was responsible for setting drilling procedures.
suggests that there was no systematic process for testing drilling
methods—including the ineffective technique of sealing off the well
160
that caused the explosion—before they were used on the rig,. Costsaving efforts in the drilling timetable were not carefully balanced
161
against the need to “not adversely affect overall risk.” Thus, latent
failures in technical design, personnel training, operational

155. Id. at 10.
156. For a discussion of the Deepwater Horizon incident, see supra text accompanying notes
6–11. The Deepwater Horizon incident is far from the only example of a latent failure that
proved to be deadly. In January 2009, one of the largest food recalls in American history took
place because of the presence of salmonella in peanut products. Gardiner Harris, Peanut Plant
Broadens Product List Under Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A15. Salmonella poisoning
from peanut butter has been linked to nine fatalities and hundreds more illnesses. Investigation
Update: Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Infections, 2008–2009, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/update
.html. The peanut processor knew that its products had tested positive for salmonella on twelve
separate occasions prior to the deadly incident, but it failed to conduct an internal overhaul or
to review food-safety measures. Harris, supra.
157. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 6, at 122.
158. Id. at 123.
159. See id. at 326 n.159 (recounting how the rig’s “Engineering Team Leader” responded to
a question about who formulated operational procedures by asking “to look at [BP’s] chart of
roles and responsibilities”).
160. Id. at 125. The commission found no evidence that BP or its partners “conducted any
sort of formal analysis to assess the relative riskiness of available alternatives.” Id.
161. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 9, at xi.
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supervision, and team communication were responsible for causing a
162
preventable accident.
Greater accountability for latent failures would also remedy an
undesirable tendency not to bring homicide charges against large
163
corporations. This lack of accountability is unsurprising given that
the difficulties in discerning latent conditions and linking them
causally to a loss of life are exacerbated when applied to large
corporate bureaucracies. Previous corporate homicide prosecutions
have largely been against small companies in which both ownership
164
and day-to-day management are vested in the same individuals. The
owner-operators of small businesses, though, are more likely to be
individually charged with homicide, rendering corporate charges
165
superfluous. In a large corporation, on the other hand, individual
liability is much more likely to be shrouded in complex organizational
and decisionmaking structures that complicate the search for a readily
identifiable individual defendant.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM’S CORPORATE
HOMICIDE LIABILITY SCHEME
In 2007, the United Kingdom’s Parliament adopted a new
166
statutory regime for corporate criminal liability for homicide. The
Act “broke dramatically” from past judicial precedent by providing a
167
specific and expanded process for holding corporations liable. A
168
long time in the making, the Act was the product of public outcry

162. See id. at x (“Better management of personnel, risk, and communications by BP and its
contractors would almost certainly have prevented the blowout.”).
163. In this respect, the United States is not alone. This failure was the primary impetus
behind the United Kingdom’s passage of a new statutory regime for corporate homicide, as
discussed in Part IV, infra.
164. See, e.g., People v. Deitsch, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163, 165 (App. Div. 1983) (sustaining an
indictment against a corporate defendant whose senior managers were responsible for
maintaining the condition that led to a fatality).
165. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
166. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19 (U.K.).
167. Beale, supra note 74, at 1495–97.
168. See James Gobert, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007—
Thirteen Years in the Making but Was It Worth the Wait?, 71 M.L.R. 413, 413 (2008) (explaining
that a corporate homicide act was first recommended in a Law Commission report dating from
the mid-1990s).
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after corporate actors escaped criminal liability for several deadly
169
incidents.
170
The Act provides that a corporation is guilty of corporate
manslaughter “if the way in which its activities are managed or
organised . . . causes a person’s death, and . . . amounts to a gross
breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the
171
deceased.” The “relevant duty of care” owed to the deceased
sounds in civil-negligence duties, including those owed to employees,
to occupiers of the corporation’s premises, and to those who receive
172
A gross breach is one in which the
the corporation’s goods.
corporation’s conduct “falls far below what can reasonably be
173
expected of the organisation in the circumstances.” Akin to the
174
MPC’s “high managerial agent” requirement,
the Act links
corporate liability to the conduct of “senior management [as] a
175
substantial element in the breach.”
To assist jurors in determining whether a gross breach has
occurred, the Act focuses their attention on several factors. The jury
is required to consider whether the corporation “failed to comply with

169. See Editorial, Deadly Negligence, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 6, 2007, at 26
(condemning the fact that only six corporations had been successfully prosecuted for
manslaughter in the twenty years following the prosecution of a corporate ferry operator for an
incident in which 193 people died); David Millward, Network Rail Fined £4m for Crash That
Left 31 Dead, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 31, 2007, at 12 (reporting that families of
victims in a deadly railway crash were calling for a corporate manslaughter law); Mark Milner,
Executives Cleared of Train Crash Blame, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 7, 2005, at 6 (reporting
that the dismissal of charges against companies whose negligence caused a deadly railway crash
spurred momentum for revisions in corporate manslaughter law).
170. The Act applies to all manner of business entities. See Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act § 1(2)(a), (d) (applying the Act to corporations, partnerships, and
other employers). Interestingly, the Act also applies to all manner of government entities. Id.
§ 1(2)(b)–(c), sch. 1. Although beyond the scope of this Note’s proposed statutory framework,
the extension of liability to governmental bodies is a matter for future consideration. It is
conceivable that through collusion or dereliction of duty, government regulators could facilitate
corporate conduct that results in death. See GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra
note 2, at 77–78 (suggesting that because of oversight failures by mine-safety regulators, mines
failed to correct known safety abuses at the Upper Big Branch mine).
171. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 1(1)(a)–(b).
172. Id. § 2(1).
173. Id. § 1(4)(b).
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962).
175. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 1(3). Senior management is
defined as those persons who play “significant roles in . . . the making of decisions about how
the whole or a substantial part of [the corporation’s] activities are to be managed or organised,
or . . . the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.”
Id. § 1(4)(c).
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any health and safety legislation that relates to the alleged breach,
and if so, . . . how serious that failure was . . . [and] how much of a risk
176
of death it posed.” In effect, this requirement supplements and
enhances the deterrent effect of existing regulations by forcing juries
to consider violations of those regulations in weighing the
manslaughter charge. The jury is also permitted to consider whether
“there were attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices within
the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any such failure
[to comply with health and safety legislation], or to have produced
177
tolerance of it.” With such latitude, the jury may consider the
corporate culture and policies that yield latent conditions as a
component of the corporation’s culpability.
By design, the dual requirements that (1) the corporation’s
conduct must fall far below what is expected and that (2) senior
management must play a substantial role in the breach largely cabin
178
the Act’s reach to “systemic failures.” This circumscription stands in
contrast to standard health and safety regulatory violations, which
may involve “operational” failures that often only require that the
corporation fall just below “the standard of reasonable
179
The Act’s dual requirements also anticipatorily
practicability.”
rebut any argument that a corporate defendant might face criminal
liability solely on the basis of a low-level employee’s unauthorized
acts. The threshold established by the Act’s two prongs—a gross
breach and the involvement of senior management—will exclude
those cases in which a low-level employee’s unauthorized acts
inflicted harm, but will not allow corporations that have clearly
180
engaged in culpable behavior to escape liability.
With respect to sentencing, the Act provides three tools. First,
courts may issue a “remedial order” requiring the corporation to
remedy “any matter that appears . . . to have resulted from the
181
relevant breach and to have been a cause of the death.” The
remedial-order power also permits a sentencing authority to address
systemic failings “in the organisation’s policies, systems or practices”

176. Id. § 8(2).
177. Id. § 8(3)(a).
178. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER & HEALTH AND
SAFETY OFFENCES CAUSING DEATH: DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 3 (2010).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 9(1)(b).

HARLOW IN FINAL

152

10/6/2011 6:52:03 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:123

182

related to the charged conduct.
Second, courts may issue a
“publicity order” requiring a corporation to publicize its conviction
183
and the relevant details of its offense and sentence. Finally, courts
184
may levy a fine on a convicted corporation.
Although only one corporation has been prosecuted under the
185
186
new Act, it has engendered much debate. Particular criticism has
been targeted at the Act’s stringent requirement that senior managers
play a substantial role in the breach, as opposed to a lesser standard
under which managers must play only an intervening or contributing
187
role. The senior-manager requirement may make it harder to
convict a large corporation in which authority is diffused through a
188
complex organizational structure.
Nonetheless, the Act is expected to have important “symbolic
189
effects.” It makes clear that, as a doctrinal matter, corporations “are
190
capable of committing crimes as grave as manslaughter.” With
juries empowered to look more globally at corporate policies,
191
corporations must “take a fresh look at their culture and ethos.”
And perhaps most importantly, indictment and conviction for
corporate manslaughter will almost certainly carry greater deterrent

182. Id. § 9(1)(c).
183. Id. § 10(1); see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, supra note 178, at 8 (stating
that publicity orders “should ordinarily be imposed in a case of corporate manslaughter” to
serve the goals of “deterrence and punishment”).
184. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act § 1(6).
185. Although the Act was passed in response to major incidents involving numerous
fatalities and large corporate actors, the only subsequent prosecution to date is of a small
engineering-consulting firm that was convicted in February 2011 and sentenced to pay a
£385,000 fine. Gloucestershire Firm Fined £385,000 over Trench Death, BBC NEWS, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-12491199 (last updated Feb. 17, 2011, 14:46 ET).
But reports suggest that authorities are considering prosecuting a large, global private-security
firm. Paul Lewis & Matthew Taylor, G4S Faces Possible Corporate Killing Charge over Death of
Deportee, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 17, 2011, at 20.
186. One commentator criticizes the Act as being “limited in its vision and lacking in
imagination.” Gobert, supra note 168, at 414.
187. See id. at 429 (“In the absence of [a command-responsibility] provision, organisations
will be able . . . to render themselves virtually manslaughter-proof by placing a junior member
of staff in charge of potentially lethal dimensions of a company’s business or safety generally.”).
188. See Brenda Barrett, Liability for Safety Offences: Is the Law Still Fatally Flawed?, 37
IND. LAW J. 100, 107 (2008) (“The only managers who have been convicted of manslaughter
following work-related fatalities have been managers or employers in small businesses.”).
189. Gobert, supra note 168, at 431; see also Barrett, supra note 188, at 117 (claiming that
the Act may also have an important impact in areas with little regulatory control).
190. Gobert, supra note 168, at 431.
191. Id. at 432.
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and punitive weight than liability for violating health and safety
192
regulations.
V. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL AND EXPLANATION
This Part seeks to initiate a discourse on corporate criminal
liability for homicide by proposing a comprehensive statutory
193
Just as legislatures enacted measures to expand
framework.
corporate criminal liability to homicide, those same bodies should
now reevaluate the efficacy of their efforts and take the lead in
194
refining corporate homicide doctrine. The provisions discussed in
this Part were devised with two primary goals in mind: (1) providing
notice of the proscribed conduct to those subject to the statute and to
195
those enforcing it, and (2) ensuring that prosecutions under the
statute satisfy the public’s need for accountability and yet are
196
tempered by the ultimate benefits of corporate rehabilitation.
A. A Proposed Corporate Homicide Statute
To address the concerns and imperfections in the existing
corporate homicide regime, the following statutory language is
proposed:

192. See Barrett, supra note 188, at 117 (arguing that, at a minimum, a “corporation will
suffer a greater stigma [for a corporate manslaughter conviction] than [for] being convicted
under [the Health and Safety at Work Act], which is too readily perceived as merely regulatory
legislation”); Gobert, supra note 168, at 431 (“All would regard manslaughter as a serious
offence; in contrast, health and safety violations are often viewed as involving technical
breaches of overly protective rules laid down by a nanny state.”).
193. There is an easier option than comprehensive statutory reevaluation: amend the
existing homicide statutes to specifically permit charges against corporations. This is not a
solution to be favored, however. Businesses presumably would favor the neutral-sounding
offense of corporate homicide over the more reprehensible charges of manslaughter or murder.
Moreover, comprehensive drafting offers greater opportunities for doctrinal reform to address
underlying systemic deficiencies in areas like causation and punishment.
194. It is accepted that a well-crafted, comprehensive statute best serves principles of
legality. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985).
195. See id. at 205 (“Notice is essential to fairness.”).
196. See Henning, supra note 90, at 1429 (“The goal . . . should be on molding punishment to
the remediation of any harm and reforming the corporation, so that retribution would play no
role in determining the appropriate criminal sanction.”).
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Model Corporate Homicide Statute
1. An organization is guilty of corporate homicide when it
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes the death of a
human being.
2. First-degree corporate homicide occurs when:
a. through the actions or omissions of an owner,
management official, or other similarly situated
individual;
b. an organization knowingly or recklessly creates or
tolerates a condition under circumstances manifesting
extreme disregard for human life; and
c. that condition causes the death of a human being.
3. Second-degree corporate homicide occurs when:
a. through the actions or omissions of an owner,
management official, supervisor, or other similarly
situated individual;
b. an organization recklessly or negligently creates or
tolerates a condition; and
c. that condition causes the death of a human being.
4. As provided in Sections 2 and 3:
a. an organization’s culpability may be established by the
knowledge and actions, whether individually or
collectively, of owners, officers, management officials,
supervisors, or other similarly situated individuals with a
duty or responsibility to communicate their knowledge to
someone else within the organization;
b. in determining liability of the organization, the following
may be considered as evidence:
i. prior health or safety regulatory violations
pertaining to the condition causing death, except
when the organization did not have notice of the
violation;
ii. organizational policies, practices, and culture.
5. An organization found guilty under Sections 2 or 3 of this Act:
a. shall be fined up to a maximum of ten million dollars per
victim; and
b. may be subject to a period of probation not to exceed five
years, with the sentencing court to consider as conditions
of probation:

HARLOW IN FINAL

2011]

10/6/2011 6:52:03 PM

CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE

155

i. the remedying of the condition(s) that led to the
loss of life;
ii. the adoption and implementation of an effective
corporate compliance program;
iii. the reassignment of those owners, management
officials, supervisors, or other similarly situated
individuals whose conduct was causally linked to
the loss of life;
iv. the efforts by the organization to refine or
restructure its operations or organization to guard
against the recurrence of the condition(s) that led
to the loss of life.
6. For the purposes of this Act,
a. “organization” means any entity registered or licensed to
do business within the jurisdiction and any entity,
whether charitable or not, engaged in the manufacture,
distribution, transportation, sale, or provision of goods or
services within the jurisdiction;
b. “owner” means any natural person or legal entity with an
ownership stake in the organization;
c. “management official” means any officer, director, or
other individual responsible for formulating or
implementing policies across the organization or within
the particular business unit where the condition existed;
d. “supervisor” means any employee to whom subsections
(b) and (c) above do not apply and who is responsible for
supervising the operational activities of the organization
or a portion thereof, and the employees carrying them
out.
B. Commentary on the Proposed Statute
1. Section One: Establishment of the Offense. The first section of
the proposed statute creates a new offense of corporate homicide. It
immediately resolves any uncertainty courts might have about the
legislature’s intent to hold corporations criminally liable for homicide.
The statute is also narrowly drawn to encompass only those
197
conditions that cause a death. It rejects previous proposals that
197. Such narrow tailoring is intended to deflect criticism that this proposal adds to the
unprincipled overbreadth of criminal law. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
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sought to extend criminal liability to all life-endangering conduct
198
whether or not a death resulted. A life-endangering offense would
sweep too broadly in situations in which the best remedy is the civil
regulatory scheme and in which early recourse to criminal law would
diminish its forcefulness. But the proposed corporate homicide
offense would apply to any person whose death was caused by
corporate action or inaction, regardless of that person’s relationship
to the corporation—employee, consumer, or member of the general
public.
2. Section Two: First-Degree Corporate Homicide. The second
section of the proposed statute sets forth the elements of the most
serious level of corporate homicide. For the statute to apply, a
corporation must have acted knowingly or recklessly, evidencing an
extreme disregard for human life by creating or tolerating a condition
199
that resulted in death. The mens rea element may also be satisfied
when corporate officials deliberately avoid attaining knowledge of the
200
Thus, liability ensues when a corporation takes
condition.
affirmative steps to create a deadly condition or when it is aware of a
condition but declines to remedy it.
By specifying the individuals whose conduct may be attributed to
the corporation, the section reaches a middle ground between
respondeat superior and the MPC’s section 2.07. The liability

Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001) (“American criminal law’s historical
development has borne no relation to any plausible normative theory—unless ‘more’ counts as
a normative theory.”). Because homicide was one of the traditional common-law crimes,
Professor Stuntz believes that modifications to homicide doctrine do not present the same
concerns about overbreadth that are presented by other expansions of criminal law. See id. at
512–13 (noting that for crimes of violence, the “definitions are not substantially broader today
than they were generations or even centuries ago”).
198. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 23, at 432–33 (advocating that Congress create an
offense for life-endangering conduct); Samuels, supra note 24, at 902 (proposing a recklessendangerment-of-an-employee offense).
199. This language is derived from the MPC’s homicide statute. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2(1) (1962) (“[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely
or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.”).
200. Federal courts routinely permit jury instructions that explain that the knowledge
requirement can be satisfied by “deliberate ignorance” or “conscious avoidance.” United States
v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also id. at 338 n.2 (citing federal
appellate cases that discuss jury instructions related to the knowledge requirement). In United
States v. Ramirez, 574 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2009), for example, the court explained that criminal
knowledge may be inferred when evidence suggests that a defendant remained deliberately
ignorant, provided that his conduct rose above “mere negligence.” Id. at 877.
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prescribed in this section is more limited than respondeat superior
because corporate officials must be of a certain seniority for their
conduct to qualify. But it is more expansive than section 2.07’s “high
managerial agent” requirement because it broadly defines
management officials and includes those employees within the
201
particular business unit where the condition existed. This provision
attempts to account for the decentralized nature of modern
corporations, with their many far-flung and distinct business units. In
sum, first-degree corporate homicide reflects a belief that the most
serious cases are those in which blameworthiness reaches the more
202
senior levels of the corporate ranks.
3. Section Three: Second-Degree Corporate Homicide. The
proposed statute’s third section sets forth the less severe level of
corporate homicide: the corporation must have acted recklessly or
negligently in creating or tolerating a condition that caused death.
Second-degree corporate homicide adopts an approach akin to
respondeat superior. It simultaneously expands the number of
corporate employees whose conduct may be the basis for liability by
203
including supervisors
and lowers the minimum mens rea to
negligence.
Although some commentators worry that recklessness- or
negligence-based liability is too flexible because it relies on a
204
“prevailing reasonable standard of care,”
those concerns are
outweighed by the costs of the alternative. To predicate liability
solely upon a minimum mens rea of knowledge would require that

201. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(B) (2010) (defining
“high-level personnel” to include “a director; an executive officer; an individual in charge of a
major business or functional unit of the organization . . . ; and an individual with a substantial
ownership interest”).
202. Cf. id. § 8C2.5(b) (prescribing an enhancement to a defendant corporation’s sentence if
either “high-level personnel of the [business] unit” or personnel with “substantial authority”
were involved).
203. Cf. id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (defining a subcategory of “corporate officials” as those
“who exercise substantial supervisory authority,” such as “a plant manager [or] a sales
manager”).
204. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 23, at 422. For Spurgeon and Fagan, this is problematic
because what is reasonable might shift in the time between the corporate actions that caused a
death and the subsequent indictment. Id. It can be assumed that Spurgeon and Fagan are
concerned with protecting conduct regarded as reasonable at the time it was taken, but which
became unreasonable by the time of the indictment. But it seems unlikely that prevailing
concepts of reasonable precautions will evolve so substantially in this time period to cause an
unjust indictment.

HARLOW IN FINAL

158

10/6/2011 6:52:03 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:123

corporate actors were “practically certain” death would result from
205
their actions or omissions. The situations in which corporate actors
will know to a high degree of certainty that their conduct will result in
death seem limited. Indeed, it is conceivable that evidence of
repeated regulatory violations related to a condition that caused
death could actually support a contrary position: How could the
corporate actors have been certain that death would result when the
unsafe condition had existed for some time without adverse
consequences? A reasonable duty of care standard ensures that not
all failures to take potentially preventative action will result in
criminal liability, but it also ensures that an organization will “provide
adequate defences against the[] unsafe consequences” that may arise
206
The reasonableness requirement entrenched
from operations.
within the recklessness and negligence duties of care sets the bar high
enough to avoid creating a situation in which a corporation feels
legally bound to take all possible precautions regardless of their
reasonableness.
4. Section Four: Collective Knowledge. The fourth section of the
proposed statute presents both a single-actor—the conventional
means of finding corporate liability—and a collective knowledge
approach to corporate liability. Under the single-actor model, a
corporation may be liable only when one of its employees or agents
207
possesses the requisite mens rea for each element of the offense.
Collective knowledge, on the other hand, works “by aggregating the
individual knowledge of several corporate employees so as to create a
208
The collective
collective state of mind for the corporation.”
knowledge standard proposed here also limits the scope of employees
whose mens rea may be imputed to the corporation to those with a
responsibility—whether imposed by law or through internal policy—
209
to report their knowledge to someone else in the organization.
The basic rationale for collective knowledge, as elucidated by the

205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962).
206. JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 206 (1990).
207. V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate
Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 357 (1999).
208. 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 8.21, at 380.
209. See United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving a
jury instruction that allowed the jury to consider knowledge gathered by “supervisor[s] or
employee[s]” against the corporation, so long as those persons “ha[d] some duty to
communicate that knowledge to someone higher up in the corporation”).
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First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., is that
“[t]he acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its
211
employees operating within the scope of their employment.” The
collective knowledge doctrine is a response to the reality that modern
“[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the
elements of specific duties and operations into smaller
212
components.” Collective knowledge also recognizes the unique
capacities for information retention, diffusion, and usage possessed by
213
organizations.
This mode of analysis is also supported by
organizational theory, which “does not attempt to reduce corporate
214
actions to individual intentions.”
The concept of collective knowledge is not without harsh
215
skeptics in academia and on the bench. But the statute proposed
here does not rise and fall with collective knowledge. The provision
may be readily severed by any jurisdiction that declines to adopt the
collective knowledge approach. Nonetheless, the debate over
collective knowledge is one worth having because it cuts to the heart
of corporate liability, given modern organizational and bureaucratic
realities.
5. Section Four: Evidence of Corporate Practices, Culture, and
Prior Regulatory Violations. Section 4.b of the proposed Act allows
prosecutors to introduce evidence of organizational culture and
policies to prove that a corporation created or tolerated a deadly

210. United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
211. Id. at 856.
212. Id.
213. See Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d at 492 (“Files may be destroyed, and people may
forget about data in file cabinets, but a memorandum . . . remains in the corporation’s
knowledge as long as the memo itself continues to exist (and, even after its destruction, as long
as a responsible employee remembers it).”).
214. Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding
of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1300 (1990).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1274 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that, in the False Claims Act context, “‘collective knowledge’ provides an
inappropriate basis for proof of scienter because it effectively imposes liability . . . for a type of
loose constructive knowledge” (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095,
1122 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs.
of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Mass. 2010) (rejecting the collective knowledge doctrine and
adhering to the principle that “a corporation acts with a given mental state . . . only if at least
one employee who acts (or fails to act) possesses the requisite mental state”); Hasnas, supra
note 33, at 1338 n.38 (“The collective knowledge doctrine is probably more vulnerable to
objections than the New York Central [respondeat-superior] standard.”).
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condition. Corporate culture is an important underlying cause of
216
corporate misconduct. Culture is an organic part of an organization
217
and reflects the desires and actions of its leadership. For example, a
corporate culture that encourages increased speed and profitability at
the unreasonable expense of safety will inevitably produce corporate
culpability evidence. Likewise, the absence of corporate policies to
ensure safe operations indicates an organization’s willingness to
218
tolerate risk. Indeed, as corporate policies “are often the results of
219
they
more than a simple aggregation of individual choices,”
constitute some of the most direct evidence against the corporation as
220
a singular entity. The use of evidence of corporate culture to prove
a corporation’s mens rea is also well established in other common-law
221
jurisdictions.
Section 4.b additionally authorizes factfinders to hear evidence
of relevant prior regulatory violations. It recognizes that a
corporation’s affirmative decision to ignore or to insufficiently cure a
dangerous condition is particularly probative “where there ha[s] been

216. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (1991) (surveying organizational studies and concluding
that “(1) each corporation is distinctive and draws its uniqueness from a complex combination
of formal and informal factors; (2) the formal and informal structure of a corporation can
promote, or discourage, violations of the law; and (3) this structure is identifiable, observable,
and malleable”); James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business Firms: Social
and Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 17–18
(2009) (“[T]he culture of a business firm . . . permeates the organization and normalizes certain
conduct.”).
217. See REASON, supra note 153, at 193–94 (describing “culture” as something that a
business “has” rather than “is” and which is modifiable through management’s efforts).
218. See, e.g., State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 228 P.3d 909, 926 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
(describing evidence that a defendant corporation charged with criminally negligent homicide
“did not hold safety meetings and had no written safety polices [sic] or written records regarding
safety training”).
219. Foerschler, supra note 214, at 1302.
220. See id. at 1303 (“[C]orporate policies . . . should be attributed to the corporate structure
as a whole and considered as conceptually independent from the intents of the individuals
within the corporation.”).
221. The Australian federal criminal code permits evidence that “a corporate culture existed
within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance” with
the prohibitive statute. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 12.3(2)(c) (Austl.). It defines a corporate
culture as “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body
corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities take
place.” Id. at s 12.3(6). Similarly, the United Kingdom’s corporate manslaughter statute permits
the jury to consider evidence of “attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices” that “were
likely to have encouraged” the corporation’s misconduct. Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act 2007, c. 19, § 8(3)(a) (U.K.).
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a prior warning by a government employee of claimed statutory
222
violations.”
The subsection also builds upon the collective
knowledge doctrine to impute awareness to a corporation regardless
of whether the employees who maintained the dangerous condition
223
were different from those who interacted with the regulators.
Section 4.b emphasizes the proposed statute’s role as a buttress
for existing regulatory regimes. Corporations are on notice that
ignoring the warning signs of regulatory violations may have adverse
repercussions in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Past regulatory
violations are probative of criminal intent because regulatory statutes
already reflect legislative or administrative policy determinations that
224
certain conduct must be prohibited. To circumscribe liability, a
jurisdiction may choose to enumerate the specific health and safety
225
regulations that apply to corporate homicide.
6. Section Five: Punishment. Punishment for corporate homicide
is bipartite, melding economic and structural sentencing policies to
226
achieve the foremost goal of rehabilitation.
The first part of
Section 5 consists of a fine of up to $10 million per victim. Criminal
fines are the standard form of corporate punishment. To omit a fine
or to provide for too minimal of a fine could subject the statute to
skepticism regardless of whether the maximum fine was ever
227
imposed. But a criminal fine alone has limited deterrent and

222. United States v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D. Minn. 1971), aff’d, 463
F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972).
223. See id. at 30–31 (finding that the defendant trucking company had willfully violated a
criminal prohibition against maintaining false logs given that regulators had warned company
officials several times about the practice, despite the fact that those officials were not the ones
maintaining the logs).
224. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 23, at 432 (“By enacting regulatory statutes that
specify allowable behavior, Congress has in effect decided which deaths caused by the industrial
process are to be excusable.”).
225. See id. at 408 & n.42 (providing an example in which a proposed federal recklessendangerment statute creates liability only for violations of certain enumerated regulatory
statutes).
226. The “Economic Model” of sentencing prefers the “us[e of] fines in lieu of corporate
probation.” Wray, supra note 117, at 2020. The “Structural Reform Model,” on the other hand,
relies on probationary measures “that will directly penetrate the bureaucratic web.” Id.
227. For example, two large corporations convicted of homicide were sentenced to fines of
$11,500 and $7,500, respectively—both of which were the statutory maximum. Chase, supra note
65 (reporting that Motiva Enterprises, an oil refiner, received the maximum fine of $11,500 for
its homicide conviction, an amount that the judge later increased through an additional
compensatory fine of $100,000); General Dynamics Land Systems Pleads No Contest in Worker’s
Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 12, 1992, available at Factiva, Doc. No.

HARLOW IN FINAL

162

10/6/2011 6:52:03 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:123

228

rehabilitative powers. If a corporation fails to undertake internal
restructuring to prevent a recurrence of the criminal conduct and
instead simply pays a fine, “society is merely pricing, not sanctioning,
229
offenders’ behavior.”
To ensure that the sentencing scheme accommodates societal
and rehabilitative interests, the proposed statute expressly provides
for the correction of fundamental deficiencies in corporate structure
and management through probation. Its rationale is comparable to
the justification behind the remedial measures provided for in the
230
federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and in the United
231
Kingdom’s corporate manslaughter statute. Corporations charged
or found guilty of corporate homicide presumably would be self
motivated to undertake an internal restructuring without prompting
by the court. But if the court finds that faulty internal controls—
nonexistent lines of communication between safety directors and
operational supervisors, for example—or culpable employees remain
232
unaddressed at the date of sentencing, it should have the authority
233
to order remedial action. A corporate probation may be “flexibly
234
tailored to corporate circumstances”
to minimize the loss of
235
managerial independence and maximize the penological value.

asp0000020011106do5c00z2u (reporting that General Dynamics was fined $7,500—the
maximum under Michigan law—for involuntary manslaughter).
228. See Khanna, supra note 40, at 1511 (advocating reliance on “cash fines until their
deterrent effect is exhausted and then [the] use [of] other legally imposed sanctions”).
229. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 652
(1996).
230. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.2(a) (2010) (authorizing sentencing
courts to use remedial orders to “eliminate or reduce the risk that the instant offense will cause
future harm”). The Guidelines offer an illustrative example of ordering “a product recall for a
food and drug violation.” Id. § 8B1.2 cmt. background.
231. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.
232. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n.5 (noting that “[a]dequate
discipline of individuals responsible for an offense is a necessary component of [the]
enforcement” of an organization’s criminal sentence).
233. See id. § 8D1.1(a)(6) (instructing courts to sentence convicted corporate defendants to
probation when “necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organization to reduce
the likelihood of future criminal conduct”).
234. Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate
Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 106 (1988).
235. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 452 (1981)
(“Ultimately, the relatively modest loss of managerial autonomy involved in such a temporary
period of probation might prove as effective a deterrent as the financial penalties today imposed
on corporations.”).
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Through corporate probation, a sentencing court may be able to draw
upon the expertise of regulators to assist in monitoring corporate
236
compliance and oversee the implementation of internal reforms.
Probation may also require a convicted corporation to publicize its
wrongful conduct—a sort of modern-day version of being placed in
237
the public stocks. Even critics of corporate probation concede that
it may be particularly useful against recidivist corporations
238
“unresponsive to monetary penalties,”
whom this statute is
expressly designed to target.
C. Illustrative Applications of the Proposed Statute
1. Upper Big Branch Mine. Of the three illustrations, Massey
Energy’s operation of the Upper Big Branch mine presents the
closest case for charging first-degree corporate homicide. To prove
causation, prosecutors could rely on the evidence of repeated minesafety violations over a prolonged period for the very conditions that
239
federal investigators believe caused the explosion. The requisite
corporate mens rea could be found based on the knowledge of the
Massey employees responsible for interacting with regulators and
240
supervising mining operations who disregarded warning signs.
The key element for sustaining an indictment of first-degree
corporate homicide is the presence of circumstances showing an
extreme disregard for human life. Here, prosecutors could rely not
only on evidence related to the direct causes of the explosion but also
to Massey’s corporate practices and culture. A report to West
Virginia’s governor about the incident found that “evidence strongly
241
suggests” that the company did not place safety before profits. An
investigation into the operation of Upper Big Branch uncovered a
236. Gruner, supra note 234, at 105.
237. The United Kingdom’s corporate homicide sentencing regime incorporates a “publicity
order” component. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, c. 19, § 10
(U.K.). For a discussion of the pros and cons of publicity orders, see Khanna, supra note 40, at
1503; and Miester, supra note 22, at 942–44.
238. Wray, supra note 117, at 2021.
239. See Broder, supra note 1 (mentioning the many citations Massey had received for
noncompliance with health and safety regulations).
240. One report suggests that high-ranking executives for the Massey Energy subsidiary
operating Upper Big Branch instructed a mine foreman not to worry about the ventilation
problems cited by regulators a few months before the explosion. Steven Mufson, Mine
Inspectors Found Negligence in January, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2010, at A2. Officials believe
these ventilation problems were ultimately the cause of the explosion. Id.
241. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 95.
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host of “deviant [safety] practices [that] became normalized.” Notes
of federal mine-safety inspectors show that senior managers told
lower-level employees who reported safety problems to disregard
243
them. Evidence also suggests that Massey made it a corporate
practice to appeal citations issued by federal regulators rather than to
244
implement more stringent safety programs.
If Massey were
convicted, it would face a maximum fine of $290 million—$10 million
per victim—and, more important, would be subject to a review of its
internal safety and compliance programs by the sentencing court.
2. Deepwater Horizon.
Assuming that BP was primarily
responsible for the joint-venture operations on the Deepwater
245
Horizon rig, a case could be built for second-degree corporate
homicide. The presidential investigatory commission found that
“management breakdown[s] . . . affected many of the operational
246
Some of these
aspects of designing and drilling the well.”
breakdowns included “inadequate communication” and “excessive
compartmentalization of information” between onshore engineers
247
and rig operators. Evidence suggests that rig operators utilized
untested drilling techniques and were left uninformed about an
earlier incident that was similar to the Deepwater Horizon
248
explosion. Moreover, in its drive to increase cost-efficient drilling
operations, BP failed to properly account for the new operational risk
249
paradigm.
These past practices and policies may demonstrate BP’s failure
to exercise reasonable care when drilling for oil on the seabed. At the
least, they could constitute negligence on the part of BP, a highly
242. Id. at 97; see also id. at 97–99 (detailing the unsafe practices at Upper Big Branch).
243. Mufson, supra note 240.
244. See GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 2, at 99–100 (“Fighting
the violations allowed Massey to pay only a third of the assessed penalties over a ten-year
period while accelerating profits, thus negating the punitive intent of the fines.”).
245. BP leased the rig from its owner, Transocean, and employed workers from Halliburton
to help operate the rig. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL &
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 6, at 2–3.
246. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 9, at 225.
247. Id. at 227–28. For a full analysis of management failures, see id. at 225–50.
248. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
249. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 9, at 242 (finding that although BP understandably sought to manage
costs, it failed “to properly account for risk or to assess the overall impact of decisions” on rig
operations as a whole).
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experienced party in drilling operations, for failing to appreciate the
deadly risks of its dysfunctional management structure and operation.
If BP were found guilty, a sentencing court might require the
corporation and its partners to restructure its joint venture to remedy
the kinds of latent conditions that proved so deadly, in addition to
imposing a fine up to the $110 million statutory maximum.
3. Glen Care Nursing Home. Glen Care presents a likely case of
second-degree corporate homicide. The assisted-living center
permitted untrained health aides to check the glucose levels of
250
residents without implementing basic disease-prevention measures.
Evidence suggests that Glen Care offered a training session on proper
disease prevention, but it failed to ensure that its employees attended
251
the session. By having untrained employees provide medical care,
Glen Care executives may have created a condition through their
negligence that caused the death of six residents. Evidence of prior
training lapses or inattention to health regulations might signify
recklessness on the part of the corporation, but it would likely not
establish the extreme indifference to human life necessary for a firstdegree charge.
Glen Care would face a statutory maximum fine of $60 million.
Given that Glen Care is a small business, however, any fine levied
should be well under the maximum. Again, it would be more
important for a sentencing court to ensure that Glen Care took
proper remedial measures to prevent a recurrence. Following its
criminal conviction, Glen Care might also need to negotiate with state
and federal regulators to ensure that it would not be debarred from
252
receiving Medicare funds.
CONCLUSION
For more than a century, a legal tension has existed between
proponents and opponents of extending criminal homicide law to
corporations. As a result of this debate—a subset of the larger
250. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
252. The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services may refuse to renew a
license for an adult-care home if the facility “shows a pattern of noncompliance with State
law . . . or otherwise demonstrates disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of residents.”
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-2.4(b) (West 2010). Providers may not receive Medicaid funds from
North Carolina if they are “not licensed or certified as required by federal and state law.” 10A
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 22F.0302 (2010); see also supra note 120.
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discussion over corporate criminal liability—the law has slowly
evolved. Whereas corporate liability for homicide was once widely
rejected, many jurisdictions have now come to accept the basic
premises of this form of liability. Nonetheless, both as a matter of
doctrine and in practice, corporate homicide liability continues to
suffer from several deficiencies that leave prosecutors unable or
reluctant to bring homicide charges against corporate defendants.
Sound public policy commends that jurisdictions confront these
deficiencies and create an effective and fair scheme to hold
corporations criminally liable when their blameworthy conduct leads
to the loss of life.
This Note seeks to assist jurisdictions by providing model
language for a corporate homicide statute. A specially crafted statute
is the best means for legislatures to balance putative corporate
defendants’ concerns about overcriminalization against society’s need
for an effective—but fair—response to egregious corporate conduct.
The deadly incidents described in this Note and others like them
confirm the pressing need for legislation; it is now up to policymakers
to decide the way forward.

